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Antidiscrimination Laws & Artistic Expression
STEVEN SHIFFRIN AND GREGORY R. SMITH

Can antidiscrimination laws be extended to those who appear on screen? Can
a white actor be rejected fI a black
role on the basis of race, when makeup
would be sufficient to make him appear
black'? Can a broadcaster be legally
compelled to hire a woman to play a
male role when, properly disguised, she
can appear to be male? Can a pregnant
actress insist on playing a sex vixen,
when clever shooting and body doubles
can successfully hide her pregnancy'?'
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, it is generally an unlawful
employment practice to discriminate
against a person on the basis of racc,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
State law is typically similar. Thus,
for example, in California, the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEt-A),
at Government Code section 12940,
makes it "an unlawful employment
practice, unless based upon a bona fide
occupational qualification, ... [qor an
employer, because of the race, ....

color, ....
or sex of any person, to refuse
to hire ... or to discharge the person

from employment ....
"
Title VII, FEHA, or equivalent provisions found elsewhere in federal and
state law have been used by employees
to state claims for discrimination based
on gender,2 pregnancy,' race, 4 physical
condition,' and age.' It has been stated
that "public policy ...is to prohibit

harassment and discrimination in
employment on the basis of any protected classification."'
Against these statutes must be set
the principle that speech designed to
entertain has historically been protected
under the First Amendment.' As the
Court observed in Buwro'n, it cannot be
doubted that communications designed
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to entertain, such as motion pictures,
"are a significant medium for the communication of ideas. They may affect
public attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct
espousal of a politici, doctrine to the
subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression."''
It is equally well established under
the U.S. Constitution that editors have
the authority to make decisions about
content without government interference. Thus the Supreme Court has
warned against "intrusion into the function of editors""' and has recognized
that, "for better or for worse, editing is
what editors are for." ' As the court
said in Olivia N., "Applied to the electronic media, the First Amendment
means that it is the broadcaster that has
',te authority to make programming
decisions."' 2
Obviously, the entertainment industry can have no general claim to immunity from antidiscrimination laws. It has
no right to take race, or age, or gender
into account in hiring writers, stage
crew, costumers, or makeup artists. But
may it take such otherwise protected
classifications into account in hiring and
firing on-screen actors and actresses'?
Hiurlev v. h'ish-Amer'ican Gay Lesbian and Bisexual Gi'aup afBoston''
suggests that the First Amendment
should trump antidiscrimination laws
when substantial free speech interests
are present. In tholev, Massachusetts,
pursuant to a public accommodations
statute prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, required
the private organizers of the St.
Patrick's Day parade in Boston to
include a group that the organizers had
wished to exclude. The organizers
maintained that the application of this
antidiscrimination statute violated their
First Amendment rights; but the lower
courts concluded, among other things,
that the First Amendment was not violated because the parade contained no
particularized message. The Supreme
Court held that no particularized message was required:
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ritten or
IT~he (onstitution looks beyond %%
spoken words as mediums of'expression....
Symbolism is a primitise but eftctise way of
expressing ideas ....'A] narrowN succinctly
articulable message is not a condition of consututiotal protection, which if confined to
expressions conveyving a particularized mes-

sage .. would neer reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock.
music of Arnold Schonberg, or Jabberwocky

verse of Lewis Carroll.

Even more important, the Court
unanimously upheld the organizers'
right to determine which contingents
would or would not march in the
parade:
[The organizers'] claim to the benefits of
[the] principle of autonomy to control one's
speech is as sound as the South Boston
parade isexpressive. Rather like a composer.
the Council selects the expressie units of the
parade from potential participants, and
though the score may not produce a particularized
message, each contingent's expression
in the Council's eyes comports with what
merits celebration on that day."'

The Court stated that the free speech
right to autonomy was engaged even if
its analogy to a composer gave the
Council credit for a more considered
judgment than it actually made. Similarly, it can be argued that television and
movie producers. like the organizers of
a parade, should be allowed to select the
members of their ensembles on the
basis of their appearance, in order to
produce the expression they desire."
This point is reinforced by tar't
v.
Cult Awareness Network. 7 The court
concluded that the Cult Awareness Network, a group formed to monitor cults
and educate the public about their
harmful effects, had a First Amendment right, and a right under the California constitution, to exclude a member of the Church of Scientology, even
if the Unruh Civil Rights Act were
applicable. The applicant entertained
views that were different from the Cult
Awareness Network, and the court
found a "substantial basis" in the record
for the conclusion that admission of the
applicant as well as other Scientologists
would impede its ability to disseminate
its preferred view." The antidiscrimi- Communications Lawyer ' ' 11

crimination in places ofpublic acconmClub's 'expressive' right of association
modations. The Jacees argued that tile would be infringed because the thrust
of'the Club's argument is that the presdepartment's ruling violated tihe First
intience of \,omen would destroy tile
Amendnlent.
mate all-male atmosphere."
The Supreme Court in Roberts conRoberts does contain dictum that
cluded that the Jaycees "'aiiled to
infringement on the rights to associate
demonstrate that the Act imposes any
for expressive purposes can be justified
serious burdens on tile
male members'
by compelling state interests, unrelated
freedom of expressive association' 2"
to tile expression of ideas, that cannot
and also concluded that there was no
be achieved through means significantbasis in the record lor the claim that
ly less restrictive of associational freeadmission of women would "impede
the organization's ability to disseminate doms. That language, however, was in
its preferred views. '2 7 Significantly, the the context of clubs and associations
active. The reporter sued, maintaining
where the members;' views were not
that the Act barred such discrimination, Roberts court noted that the Act
diflerent firom those of the association.
imposed "no restriction on the organiand the Washington Supreme Court
So understood, the chance of a signifiagreed.2(Nonetheless, the court held
zation's ability to exclude individuals
cant impact oil expressive association
with ideologies or nhilosophies differthe statute was unconstitutional as
would be slight. Ally broader reading
applied to the News Tribune. The court ent from its existing members.""2h
of the Roberts dictumn would seem to be
The cases following Roberts simistated that "editorial integrity and credforeclosed by the unanimous ruling in
larly do not involve subs;tanlial cl 1 imis
ibility are core objectives of editorial
IIIrlev. In commenting oil the clubs
of expressive rights. New )ork''ate
control and thus merit protection under
and association cases, the Court iil /hrthe free press clause." 21 "if a newspaper Club Associations v.('t of Nn'ew )ork'
le' made it clear that antidiscrimination
upheld a facial challenge to New York
cannot be required to publish a particuCity's antidiscrimination law as applied laws seeking to open up clubs and assolar reporter's work, how can it be conto clubs deemed to be public. Tihe court ciations must give way if enforcing
stitutionally required to employ the
them would "trespass on the organizaobserved that some associations might
individual as a reporter?" 22 The court
tion's message." .4
concluded: "Choosing an editorial staff be able to make a showing that their
Taken together, these cases strongly
is a core press function, at least when
expressive rights were violated, but no
indicate that on-screen performances
that choice is based on editorial consid- showing appeared in the record about
cannot constitutionally be included
any of the clubs covered by the law.
erations." 23
within the scope of antidiscrimination
The same analysis ought to apply to Board o'Directotw of Rotary Internalaws, and that producers cannot be
lional. upheld the sex discrimination
on-screen performers-choosing the
required by antidiscrimination statutes
aspects of the Unruh Act as applied to
ensemble of actors and actresses of a
to select and use actors and actresses
television production is a core editorial
Rotary Clubs, finding that the Rotary's
protected service activities would likely whose appearances are not in their
function. If an antidiscrimination
view right for the part, or would require
be strengthened, not weakened, and
statute cannot constitutionally be
alterations in filming and presentation
suggesting in dictum that any slight
applied on behalf of reporters for their
which impact their subjective artistic
off-the-job activities (which cannot be impact would be justified. Itishon v.
judgment.Y5
King & Spauhiing,' a sex discriminaseen in the pages of the newspaper),
No arm of the government, whether
such a statute ought not constitutionally tion case in which a woman sought to
the legislature, the judge, or the jury,
to be applicable to compel producers to be considered as a partner in a law
ought to be able to override these
firm, found no indication that tile
law
hire, or to continue to employ, persons
expressive choices. Tile producers right
firin's ability to fulfill expressive funcin protected classifications where
"to taito control the casting process ---tions would be inhibited by consideraappearance is deemed by the producer
tion of the petitioner for partnership on lor tile speech" -- ought to be protected
to be relevant.
by the First Amendment.
her merits. l('arfiehlv. )eninmda Go/f
There are, of course, numerous
and Lotunrt' C'ub invalidated sex discases where antidiscrimination laws
crimination by a golf'and country club,
have been used to open up clubs and
Endnotes
associations. None of these cases, how- noting there was "no appreciable effect
I.The authors of this article representon it,;
members' freedom of expressive
ed Spelling Entertainnicnt Group, Inc.. in
ever, involved any serious claim of
connection with the appeal from a trial
association." Finally, in Bohemian
expressive (as contrasted with associacourt judgnent in tavor of' hunter Tylo.
tional) rights. The seminal case involv('lu v.l./Il 0 the Bohemian Club
who was fired from the shNow "Melrose
ing clubs and associations is Roberts v. sought to overturn an order requiring it
Place" when she became pregnant.
24
to cease its practice of refusing to conUnitedJaycees. The national organi2. Roseaf'eld v. Souihern Pac. Co., 444
Tile
sider
women
for
employment.
sought
to
sanction
zation of Jaycees
F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971): Stender v. Lucky
court of appeal upheld the order against Stores, Inc., 803 F.Supp. 259 (N.D.Cal.
local Jaycees in Minnesota for admita First Amendment attack based on
ting women. The Minnesota Depart1992).
rights of intimate association. It specifiment of Human Rights ruled that any
3. Cleveland lid. of lEduc. v. LaFcur,
cally stated, however, that it "need not
imposition of sanctions would violate
414 U.S. 632 (1974); Badih v. Myers. 36
Cal. App. 4th 1289 (1995).
address the question of whether the
the state's prohibition of gender dis-

nation statute was trumped by the First
Amendment interest.'"
In a similar vein the Washington
Supreme Court held an antidiscrimination statute unconstitutional as applied
to a claim of free press. Washington's
Fair Campaign Practices Act prohibits
employers from discriminating against
employees for their political activity.
The News Tribune transferred an
employee from her position as education reporter to that of swing shift copy
editor because she had been politically
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